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Burrows, Jason E. M.A., April 2000

Philosophy

Toward an Understanding o f Genetic Information Within Society: Three Essays
Chairperson: Albert Borgmann

/V B >

With the rapid advances being made in the field o f applied genetics, it is
imperative that society’s understanding of these developments keep apace. Currently,
there is no systematic fiamework in which to analyze the relative merits and demerits o f
genetic advances. Rather, work in the social and ethical implications o f genetics has
tended to be piecemeal, ignoring crucial distinctions and relying upon outmoded theories
o f decision-making.
In this portfolio, I attempt to provide the fundaments of a framework for
understanding the social implications of genetics and to clarify some o f the confusions
that arise as genetics is applied to our social institutions. I focus upon three areas of
concern. First, using information theory, I distinguish between two types o f meaning that
may be found within genetic information: instrumental meaning and final meaning. Then
through an analysis o f Heidegger’s theory of technology, I illustrate the reliance o f the
genetic enterprise on technology and how this partnership influences our use o f genetics.
Second, I elucidate two commonly misunderstood sets o f concepts in efforts to protect
genetic privacy: the two distinct prongs of privacy and the two kinds of genetic
information. Once these misconceptions are clarified, the prongs o f privacy are applied
to the kinds o f genetic information in order to protect more securely the fundamental
liberties o f persons. And finally, I address the thicket of ethical problems that surfaces in
the context o f genetic prenatal testing, and argue that before we bring traditional moral
theories to bear upon dilemmas in prenatal decision-making we need to provide more
substantial definitions o f concepts that such decision-making will necessarily employ.
Through this series of papers, I hope to not only provide the fundaments of a
framework within which a more comprehensive, and thus effective, understanding of the
developments might develop, but also to give some demonstration o f how such a
ffameworic might be applied in different contexts.

■
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Preface
When Francis Crick and James Watson proposed the double helical structure o f
DNA in 1953, it was hard to imagine the predictive power and the effects that their
discovery would have at the end o f the 20* century. After several decades of basic
research on the structure o f DNA, we are just beginning to realize the plethora of
practical applications for genetic information. The studfy of genetics has revolutionized
areas as diverse as medicine, law, agriculture, and environmentalism. Because o f the
wide range o f uses for genetics, we in society are constantly inundated with reports o f
breakthroughs in genetic research and new applications for the principles o f genetics.
But in the deluge of updates, relatively little systematic commentary exists by which to
understand these developments and their impact on traditional societal values. The three
papers in this thesis portfolio are thus an attempt to provide a framework in which we
may understand the myriad ways that genetics infuses society. Given the variety o f
societal issues surrounding genetics, these three papers are best understood as conceptual
ground-clearing rather than an attempt to set out specific directives for action, although
they do identify certain parameters within which future debate should focus.
Throughout the three papers, I often allude to a problem caused by the large
number of news reports regarding genetic advances and applications, and thus, would like
to clarify this problem at the outset. Because of the massive breadth of the genetic
enterprise, the wide-ranging applications o f genetics, and the predictive power o f
genetics, changes are occurring in our societal institutions perhaps faster than our
understanding can keep pace. Lay readers and even isolated researchers are unable to
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comprehend the fiill extent to which developments in genetics affect their lives. Lagging
behind in this conceptual race leaves issues either ignored or inadequately addressed.
To provide some quantitative and qualitative support for the claim that the
advances o f genetics are proceeding faster than our ability to understand them, I have
researched news articles related to genetics in the New York Times for the past 365 days.
Within this one year period, 792 articles have been published that directly deal with
advances in genetics or the application of genetics. * On average, 2.1 articles related to
genetics appear in the daily New York Times. While the mere frequency is not
astounding, when the specific content and pathos of these 2.1 articles vary, as they do,
over the wide spectrum o f genetic applications, we are left with mixed messages
regarding the import o f the “genetic revolution.”
For example, news articles can be positive and elicit hope (“Hint o f Success In
Gene Therapy” Mar. 2,2000), or they can be negative and tragic (“Teenager’s Death
Shaking Up Field of Human Gene-Therapy Experiments” Jan. 27,2000). They can show
concern (“Senators Press For Answers On Gene Trials” Feb. 3,2000), or they can
demonstrate apathy (“Concerns on Human Test Don’t Seem to Faze Biotech Investors”
Feb. 19,2000). News articles may focus upon political issues (“Study Questions Gene
Influence on Male Homosexuality” April 23,1999), or they might appeal to
anthropological interests (“Study Alters Time Line For the Splitting of Human
Populations” Mar. 16,1999). Applications of genetics can be presented as overtly
eugenic (“Scientist at Work: Joe Z. Tsien; O f Smart Mice and an Even Smarter Man”
Sep. 7, 1999), or can be portrayed with a cautionary tone (“Cancer Gene Tests Turn Out

' All information referred to here, including a complete list of news articles for the previous 365 days, can
be accessed at www.nvtimes.com and doing a keyword search for ‘gene’ in the 365 day archive.
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To Be Far From Simple” Aug. 17,1999). And finally, the pathos o f news articles can be
serious (“PERSONAL HEALTH; Choosing to Test for Cancer’s Genetic Link” Aug. 17,
1999) or it can be comical (“Scientists Place Jellyfish Genes Into Monkeys” Dec. 23,
1999).
In combination with the steady frequency o f genetic reporting, the diverse
applications, goals, and opinions o f the genetic enterprise can often mislead persons when
attempting to understand how these developments affect their lives. One popular way of
understanding modem genetics is to underestimate its particular potency. It might be
argued that the use of modem genetics in fields like genetic engineering is no different
than the use o f selective breeding techniques. Humans have been genetically altering
nature for over 12,000 years through the domestication o f both plants and animals. But
as Reiss and Straughan point out in their book. Improving Nature?: The Science and
Ethics of Genetic Engineering, traditional biotechnology, i.e. domestication o f plants and
animals, differs from modem genetic engineering in three key aspects: relatedness of
species, the pace o f change, and the number o f species implicated. First, while traditional
biotechnology bred and crossed closely related species, modem genetic engineering
exchanges genes between two or more widely dissimilar species, i.e. human genes in
pigs, bacterial genes in plants, or jellyfish genes in monkeys. Second, traditional
breeding and crossing occurs over the course o f years and generations; changes occur
within a matter of days or weeks in genetic engineering. And third, traditional
biotechnology is mostly limited to only those species that provide food or drink, while no
organism is beyond the reach o f modem genetic engineering. (5) Thus, understanding
the developments of genetics as merely extensions o f past practices is foolish.
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However, the impact of genetics upon our lives can also be overestimated.
Reports of “smart genes” or “long-life genes” can usher in a utopian vision for the future
of humankind devoid o f suffering. But these visions overlook the acute suffering and
sacrificing o f persons that would be necessary to achieve such eugenic goals. We must
therefore avoid either of these extreme interpretations o f the impact o f genetics, and come
to a more reasonable understanding of the developments in genetics and the underlying
values that drive them if we are to employ the benefits o f modem genetics wisely.
In this thesis, I take up three issues in the much larger project of comprehending
the impact o f genetics on society. The first paper, “Finding Meaning in Genetic
Information,” addresses two questions that arise as we aw%it the completion o f the
Human Genome Project in 2003. First, what does it mean to know one’s genetic code?
Drawing upon information theory, I try to demonstrate that the genetic code has no
meaning outside o f a mere causal relation to the development of organisms. Therefore,
any meaning that is derived from genetic information is originally bestowed upon it by a
collective agreement among persons. Since DNA lacks meaning in and of itself, we are
then able to reconsider the meaning that we give to it. The second question that I address
is why do we assign the meaning that we do to genetic information? An answer to this
question can be found in Heidegger’s ontology o f being in relationship to technology.
Because our relationship to the genome is always mediated through technology, we have
a predisposition to assigning meaning to DNA in a certain manner, namely as a resource.
But this manner o f making resources out of technologically mediated things has a
tendency to extend to the manner in which we receive meaning from things unmediated
by technology. I thus conclude that we must remain vigilant in our efforts to avoid
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confusion between assigning meaning to the genetic code and receiving meaning from
the persons and organisms that are expressions o f a genetic code. Through this paper, I
hope to establish parameters within which discussions of meaning can proceed, thus
making available the possibility of directing the usage o f genetic information.
The second paper, “Challenges to Genetic Privacy,” takes a more practical look at
one issue that arises with the availability o f genetic information: genetic privacy. As
genomes are decoded and tests become available for certain genetic traits and diseases,
the results o f these tests render persons vulnerable to unwarranted scrutiny and
discrimination. I attempt to clarify two sets o f concepts that attend this issue and that
confuse attempts to secure persons from infringements o f their basic liberties.
The constitutional right to privacy is a difficult right to employ correctly. Partly,
this is because it is an unenumerated right, and the argument for its establishment was
muddled. And partly, confusion arises because there are two distinct protections that fall
under the right to privacy. I then apply these two protections to another distinction
between the two kinds of genetic information: the genotype and the phenotype. In this
process, it becomes apparent that to truly protect persons from the infringement o f their
basic liberties, we need more than legal rules of conduct. Privacy law plays an important
role in securing persons from genetic discrimination based upon their genomes, but it is
inadequate to govern the subtle discrimination that occurs based upon phenotype. I thus
partition off the realm of legal efforts to protecting against genotypic discrimination, and
relegate the remaining issues to the realm o f ethics.
It is within the realm of the ethical that the issues surrounding genetic information
abound. The third paper, “Limitations o f Morality in the Context o f Prenatal Genetic
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Testing,” thus attempts to explicate the thicket of ethical problems that attend one,
relatively specific, application of genetics; prenatal testing. Because o f the tangled web
o f ethical problems, we in society should not be too eager to apply traditional moral
theories to the dilemmas that arise. Following Bernard Williams, I argue that we must
concentrate upon identifying and delineating the issues involved in prenatal testing. The
striking result of such an approach is that many o f these issues rely upon substantive
concepts, like “quality o f life,” which are currently ill-defined. Only after fully
understanding the issues involved will we be in a position to make the tough decisions
that must be made regarding prenatal testing.
Although the three papers are separate and may be read in any order, I have
arranged them so that certain common ideas might develop through the succession of
papers. In “Finding Meaning in Genetic Information,” I give a broad, conceptual
framework in which the other two papers can be understood. “Challenges to Genetic
Privacy” applies the distinction between technologically mediated and unmediated things
to the problem of genetic discrimination, yielding a realm o f legal protections and a call
to develop ethical protections. One o f the challenges to creating these ethical protections
is the tension between individual autonomy and the state’s pursuit o f the public’s general
welfare. The legal foundations o f personal autonomy are addressed in “Challenges”
while the state’s interests receive an interesting twist in “Limitations of Morality in the
Context of Prenatal Testing.”
Through the distinctions and clarifications presented in these three papers, I hope
to provide some basic conceptual tools to understand the impact that developments in
genetics have upon our lives. While I have undoubtedly left important questions
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unanswered, I hope to have developed a useful framework in which to address these
questions, including some illustration o f how we might go about resolving them.
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Finding Meaning in Genetic Information
I. Introduction
An inordinate amount of information is being amassed within genetic research,
ranging from the isolation of drought-resistant genes in crops to a gene disproportionately
found in women with breast cancer. However, within the deluge o f news reports and
research breakthroughs, the genetic enterprise lacks any sustained discussion o f what this
information means. What does it mean to know the gene for X? Or, what information is
actually being conveyed in the sequences of DNA? It would be helpful to devise a
method through which meaning is reliably and unequivocally extracted from a set of
information. But more able persons than I have attempted to provide such a method and
have been unsuccessful. In this paper, I resign myself to the more humble task of
determining how we know when we have the wrong meaning o f genetic information. I
investigate the extent to which the meaning that is extracted can influence how we think
about the referent. Specifically, I will focus upon the area o f human genetic information
and assign the boundaries for extrapolating meaning from our genetic code. My concern
is the extent to which the information yielded by our genetic code can legitimately affect
the way in which we think o f ourselves in relationship to our origins, our identities, and
our world, and why we sometimes insist that it will.
II. Defining the Problem
Based upon genetic differences, anthropologists are currently attempting to trace
the migrations of human populations back in time to their origins. If we follow a reversal
of the genetic clock, we could reasonably expect to find, in concert with archeological
data, that the paths o f native South and North Americans could be retraced across the

-
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Bering Strait into Siberia. The paths of the Aborigines of Australia and the South Pacific
would merge with the Native Americans and Northeast Asians somewhere in Central
Asia, and converge upon the Middle East as the trails o f the peoples o f Europe sweep
Southward. Ultimately, it may be found that it is most genetically plausible that the
ancestral lineage of all humans traces back to one locale in East Africa.*
Within academic circles, the response to this scenario might generally be one of
detached interest. To academics, the importance o f this information is determined by
their interest in the subject and applicability to their particular field o f study. For the
most part, this information does not disrupt their fundamental understanding o f the world.
There are other sets o f data, i.e. the archeological record and linguistic analyses, that have
sufficiently illustrated this point. Its relevancy to their sense of identity and history has
already been digested. Within other circles, however, the meaning of the information
contradicts fundamental beliefs that give meaning and purpose to the lives o f the
members o f those circles. Take for example the Native North Americans, whose oral
tradition centers their community and provides a link to their heritage. In many of these
oral traditions, it is said that the Creator placed the tribe upon the earth in their particular
locale.^ To locate their origin anywhere else would be to take away their connection to
that locale, and likewise the identity they have formed with their historical and cultural
surroundings. Because the results of the anthropological study might suggest a different
origin, many tribes have vowed not to participate in the collection of the DNA samples
needed to complete this study. Regardless of how one evaluates this situation, the

* See Cavalli-Sforza.
^ See James Welch’s Fool’s Crow for a retelling of the Blackfeet’s connection with the land of the Northern
Rocky Mountain Divide (the Backbone of the World).
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example shows that, at the very least, information has the potential to alter our basic
understanding of the world.
Through this example, we see two very different ways in which the meaning of
meaning can be construed. First, there is the way represented by the academic circle’s
response to the above scenario. I shall call this instrumental meaning. Meaning in this
sense is useful for obtaining something else. It has relevance in relation to another set of
information, and thus is useful only toward some other end. The response elicited by the
academics reflects the fact that its usefulness in garnering other information is redundant.
Other sets of information have already convincingly demonstrated the conclusion most
likely to be reached by the genetic anthropologist. The deeper meaning of the study is
easily digested and flows smoothly into the current worldview o f the academics. This
second type of meaning is what gives purpose to the life o f a person. It constitutes a
necessary part of the identity of an individual. In this deeper sense, meaning is an end in
itself. I shall call this deeper stnst, final meaning. But the integration of the
anthropological study upon a person’s worldview does not always flow so easily. It is
precisely because some Native Americans interpret the projected results of the study as
contradicting their final meaning that they refuse to participate.
With the help o f the distinction between instrumental and final meaning, the focus
of my paper becomes clear. I am not concerned with the instrumental meaning o f genetic
information. I am not directly concerned with the uses to which genetic information can
be applied. In this paper, the questions regarding cloning and choosing the physical
characteristics of a child are of secondary importance. Although these are interesting
questions concerning what we can and should do with genetic information, I am mainly
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conceraed with the extent to which genetic information can impact the conception o f
ourselves as human beings. We will necessarily deal with instrumental meaning, but
only to shed light upon final meaning, the latter lying deeper than the former. We must
therefore excavate through the instrumental to understand the boundaries o f final
meaning. Ultimately, it is from these depths that the questions raised by the application
o f genetics will ultimately find answers. But let us postpone our concern over these
matters and focus upon the limits to which final meaning is found within genetic
information.
III. DNA as Information
If we are going to attempt a foray into the meaning that can and cannot be found
in our genetic code, we must begin with examinations of DNA, information, and the
extent to which the genetic code is information. Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) is a
twisted ladder of molecules. The sides o f the ladder are an alternating arrangement of
phosphates and a sugar called ribose. The rungs are a combination of two nucleotide
bases, each base branching fi’om its respective single strand o f ribose-phosphate complex
and fusing in the middle. There are four nucleotide bases that make up the rungs o f the
ladder; adenine (A), guanine (G), cytosine (C), and thymine (T). Only A ’s bind with T ’s
and vice versa, and only C s bind with G’s and vice versa. Along one side of the twisted
ladder, any nucleotide base can physically precede or follow any other.
In this thumbnail sketch o f the structure o f DNA, we are searching for the way in
which DNA is information so that the meaning o f the information can be understood. So
within the orderly structure of DNA, we see at least one way in which it can be thought
o f as information. At its most basic, all information must have some orderly arrangement
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or stnicture. But the fact that everything with structure is information in some way
makes the structural sense o f DNA a tautology, rendering this conception of DNA as
information unilluminating. The particular way in which DNA is information cannot be
discerned by its orderly arrangement.
However, if we connect the orderly arrangement o f DNA to ideas in information
theory, it is tempting to think that this structure could be quantified, thus giving us a
measure o f the information encoded by the DNA. Perhaps we might get a glimpse of the
character of DNA in the process o f knowing how much information DNA contains. In
his paper, “The Mathematical Theory o f Communication,” Claude Shannon demonstrates
the relationship between information and probability. He states that in order to maximize
information, probability must be minimized. Extrapolating from this relation, in order to
quantify information, one must first quantify improbability. One of the three methods
that he uncovers is to look at the possibilities o f various outcomes. If we take a randomly
arranged single strand of DNA, the possibilities available for the first nucleotide base
observed is four, since there are four possible nucleotide bases. The possible
combinations for the first and second nucleotide bases are then 16; and for the first,
second, and third are 64. Each new nucleotide multiplies the previous number of
possibilities by four, thereby dividing the probability by four. The amount of information
as measured by improbability thus grows at an exponential rate.
The number o f possibilities quickly becomes incomprehensible, especially
considering the millions o f nucleotide bases along a strand o f DNA. In order to render
these quantifications of information manageable, we can use the logarithm to the base 4
of the possibilities. So for one nucleotide, there are four possibilities: 4 log 4 = 1 ; with
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two nucleotides and 16 possibilities, 4 log 16 = 2; and with three nucleotides and 64
possibilities, 4 log 64 = 3, etc. The resulting numbers ( 1 , 2 , 3 , . . . ) are thus measures o f
information as a representation of the logarithm o f possibilities. A strand o f DNA can
then be said to contain as much information as the number o f nucleotide bases that
constitutes its chain.
However, what must be noticed is that these numbers are essentially meaningless.
The improbability that has been quantified is not a measure o f information qua
information, but information space. So when we talk about genetic information, we
should note that this information is devoid o f content. Whatever meaning is given to the
genetic structure derives from how we impart meaning to it. We must therefore move to
an examination of how content or meaning enters information space.
It should be remembered that meaningful information is not a structured object.
Generally, meaningful information is a relation between a sign and a person and that sign
and a thing. There are five component parts that make up this information relation; a
sign, a thing, a person, intelligence and a context. A person must be present and aware o f
a sign. But the person must also have some background information or intelligence in
order to connect the sign to the thing that it represents, and this cormection between
persons and things via signs occurs only within larger contexts o f meaning.
Meaning thus presents a particularly thorny problem for understanding
information. In our quest to find meaning in information, we have been reducing
information to its constituent parts. But as we do so, we lose the context which is
essential for grasping meaning. We must therefore shift our focus away fi-om the
structure o f DNA and to the contexts in which we find DNA.
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Opposed to the biological, stnictural sense o f information, we can distinguish a
cultural sense Of information, in which information instructs our conception o f reality. In
his book. Three Scientists and their Gods. Robert Wright discusses two metaphors by
which people understand DNA as information. Wright first designates DNA as
information in much the same way that a blueprint is information. They are both plans
that direct thé construction Of â niajor architectural project. Just as a realized blueprint is
a building, so is a realized set of chromosomes an organism (97), Wright also likens
DNA to information through the analogy o f nucleotide bases (A, C, G, T) o f DNA being
like the letters of the alphabet. During replication, an enzyme unzips the two strands of
DNA. The exposed sequence Of nucleotide bases are transcribed' into à string Of
messenger RNA, which, for our purposes, is essentially a template o f the original DNA
sequence. This messenger RNA then travels outside o f the nucleus and into the body of
the cell where it encotmters a cellular organelle. Called a ribosome, and is translated' into
a protein. In this process, the ribosome attachés to a particular three basé séquencé,
called a triplet codon, and initiates translation. While attached, the ribosome facilitates
the joining of an amino acid specifically configured to correspond with this triplet codon.
The ribosome then moves down the chain to the next three mid facilitates the Joining of
thé néxt amino acid. This process continués until thé ribosome attachés to a triplet
designated as a stop codon, and punctuates the new protein chain. To complete the
analogy, since nucleotide bases are like letters, triplet codons can be thought of as words,
an amino acid like the meaning o f a word, and a protein chain like the meaning o f a
sentence of triplet ‘words’ (98).
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Looking at molecular genetics in this way is much like tiying to decipher an
unknown language. We need a translator in order to understand the meaning of the
‘sentences’ and their constitutive ‘words. ’ The ribosome decodes the genetic triplets, and
reveals the meaning o f the triplet to be a specific amino acid. With this analogy, it thus
seems that the meaning of DNA lies in the progression o f DNA to RNA to amino acids to
proteins. Taken further, the proteins go on to build the organism, so the ultimate meaning
of DNA is the resultant organism. Like in the blueprint analogy, DNA directs the
construction o f the realized DNA, the organism. But a serious problem underlies both
analogies. To use the word meaning’ in this way is to broaden its definition to the point
where anything within a causal relation has meaning. DNA is causally related to the
production o f proteins, but a protein is by no means that to which DNA refers.
Something entirely different must be known in order for the genetic code to have
meaning. Content does not enter into the genetic code just because it has a causal
connection to the development of an organism.
This point can be supported in connection to our understanding of the information
relation. With the letters of the alphabet analogy, there is no doubt that there is
information, as information space, in the processes of transcription and translation, i.e.
we can calculate the possibilities. However, this alone does not constitute information.
There must be content that enters into the information space. Information becomes
meaningful when the aboutness o f some thing is relayed to an intelligent person by a sign
within a context. We must then identify the parts o f genetic processes that correspond to
the parts o f the information relation and inquire into the relationship within which the
meaning o f the DNA sequence is the resultant organism.
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If we take DNA to be a set of signals or signs, we need the intelligence to
recognize the thing(s) to which they refer. Without this, DNA has no meaning. But
when we look at the processes of the nucleus, background information tells us that DNA
is not a sign in any way. It does not represent any state o f affairs within its environment.
DNA is passive. It has an orderly structure, but it is not an agent o f order in any active
sense. Rather, the environment bumps into the double helix, chemical affinities
determine which molecules will bind together, and a protein strand is produced. So DNA
can be neither a sign that refers to something in the environment, nor the thing to which a
sign refers. Rather, it is a processor of signs. Molecules in the nucleus are the signs that
bump into the DNA. They deliver messages as to conditions within the nucleus or cell,
such as low concentration o f molecule X, meaning ‘time to replicate. ’ In this way, DNA
is not so much the subject o f information, but a processor of it (Wright 109-110). At the
microscopic level, it thus seems that DNA is best suited to play the role of person within
the information relation. But since we necessarily find meaning within the information
relation from our perspective, DNA cannot convey the meaningful information that we
often assume. It therefore seems that DNA can have no meaning for us except within the
broad notion of being causally connected to the construction o f an organism.
So if no meaningful information, neither structural nor cultural, can be expected
from DNA, why do we place so much importance on cracking its code? Is it to finally
know which configuration, out of the possible billions, the sequences of adenine,
guanine, cytosine, and thymine actually take? The Human Genome Project has been
sequencing the nucleotides of DNA and unlocking the causal relationship between these
sequences and the organism for over a decade. It is an international cooperative project
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costing billions of dollars and hundreds o f thousands of research hours. What are the
underlying motives for undertaking such a massive project?
The Human Genome Project is a paradigm example o f the implementation of
modem technology. The research being done is made possible by the advances in
microscopic technology, and would have been unimaginable prior to this technology. As
such, an investigation into modem technology will provide some clues as to why we
pursue a project of such magnitude. Along the way, the elusive question of the meaning
of genetic information with which we have wrestled will also begin to take shape.
IV. Understanding the Essence o f Technology
In “The Question Concerning Technology”, Heidegger explores the essence of
technology. As he states at the beginning, “the essence o f technology is by no means
anything technological”, it is a way o f being and thinking (4). Technology influences the
way in which we see the world, and thus, how we interact with it. This conception of
technology is in opposition to the instrumentalist school o f thought, which holds that
technology is simply a morally neutral tool. It is neither good nor bad. The
instrumentalists define technology as a human activity in which the ends are already
given, and technology offers the means to achieve those ends.
On a prima facie level, this seems correct. We do use technology in order to
procure various predetermined ends. However, technology also has typical uses. As we
put these technologies to typical uses we make basic material decisions as to what kind of
society we will inhabit. As these decisions manifest themselves in society, individuals
are prodded into making life decisions that are in concert with the way society is
organized. For example, our society is organized around the automobile. Because of the

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

-11 -

car, grocery stores are super markets, centrally located within a district they are outside
of neighborhoods and beyond walking distance. Our jobs almost invariably require a
commute, and city planning is designed around the flow of the traffic. The effects o f the
automobile have altered the way we think about transportation to the extent that when we
leave our house, the question ‘By what means am I going to get there?’ never crosses our
minds Technology is no mere means, but rather an infusion into our way o f thinking.
For Heidegger, the instrumental definition of technology is correct, but not true.
The truth o f something makes itself present when its essence is revealed. Wherever
somediing is used as an instrument to bring about an end, the rules o f causality underlie
this bringing-about. Heidegger refers to the Aristotelian four causes of causa materialise
formalis,ftnalis, and efficiens as being responsible for something coming into appearance
or presence. These four causes bring forward an object as something that lies ready
before us (6). The essence of causality is this setting something forward. It is the
revealing of the concealed. So when we look into instrumentality as a means, which is
generally regarded as the mark o f technology, we see technology as something deeper, as
a revealing.
Although all technology is a revealing, modem technology is of a special type.
Heidegger distinguishes two types o f revealing, or bringing-forth into presence. The first
is a bringing-forth in which the Greeks used the term poiesis. In its highest sense, poiesis
is “the arising of something from out o f itself,” and “has the bursting open belonging to
bringing-forth, e.g., the bursting of a blossom into bloom, in itself’ (10). In a lower
sen^, poiesis can also refer to the buisting open that is caused by a craftsman or artisan.
But both senses o f revealing as poiesis fail to account for that which occurs in modem
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technology. The harsh coldness of modem technology does not set well with the poetical
nature o f poiesis. Modem technology is a bringing-forth, but unlike poiesis, it is a
revealing as challenging. It challenges nature to ' supply energy that can be extracted and
stored as such” (14).
As a challenging, modem technology unlocks the secrets of nature and uses them
to further the goals of something else. This information is then stockpiled, ready to be
used at the moment it is called upon. Heidegger gives the example o f a power plant set
into the Rhine River.
The hydroelectric plant is set into the current o f the R hine.
It sets the Rhine to supplying its hydraulic pressure, which
then sets the turbines turning. This turning sets those
machines in motion whose thrust sets going the electric
current for which the long-distance power station and its
network o f cables are set up to dispatch electricity. In the
context o f the interlocking processes pertaining to the
orderly disposition of electrical energy, even the Rhine
itself appears as something at our command. The
hydroelectric plant is not built into the Rhine River as was
the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for
hundreds of years. Rather the river is dammed up into the
power plant. What the river is now, namely, a w^ter power
supplier, derives from out o f the essence o f the power
station. In order that we may even remotely consider the
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monstrousness that reigns here, let us ponder for a moment
the contrast that speaks out of the two titles, “The Rhine” as
dammed up into the power works, and “The Rhine” as
uttered out o f the art work, in Hdlderlin’s hymn by that
name. But it will be replied, the Rhine is still a river in the
landscape, is it not? Perhaps. But how? In no other way
than as an object on call for inspection by a tour group
ordered there by the vacation industry. (16)
With the placement o f modem technology into the river, the concealed energy o f the
Rhine was exposed, transformed, stored, and distributed in a form unrecognizable to its
source. The energy o f the river was extracted and set aside as a resource, immediately at
hand. In like manner, modem technology orders everything to be always ready to be
used. By tuming an object into a resource, the object no longer presents itself to us;
rather, it is a subject under our control. The most interesting change that occurs is not the
transformation of concealed energy to usable energy; it is the alteration in how we view
the river. The Rhine now refers to something different, namely a power supplier. By
setting a piece of modem technology into the river, we have changed the meaning of that
river. Likewise, whenever technology is set upon an object, it orders that object into a
resource and changes its meaning.
V. Applying Heidegger’s Essence o f Technology to Genetic Information
We left our discussion o f genetic information with the conclusion that no
meaningful information can be found within DNA. If we attempt to get meaning out o f
the information space o f DNA, we end up not with meaning, but with a causal relation.
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DNA facilitates the production o f proteins by processing signs (molecules) referring to
the state of affairs within its cellular environment. As a causal relation, the essence o f
DNA lies in its coming to presence. But in order to be aware o f its presencing, we extend
the powers of our observation through instruments of modem technology. Because the
genetic sequencing is only possible within a highly technical enterprise, the revealing
uncovers not the poetic blooming forth o f DNA, but rather, DNA as a resource. The
genetic enterprise reveals as a challenging-fbrth of the DNA to unlock its secrets, then
sets them aside to be altered, manipulated, and ready to be at hand when needed. By
setting technology upon the genome, we thus change our conception o f the DNA. It
becomes not that which processes information into instructions for the cell or that which
facilitates the blossoming forth o f an organism; rather, DNA becomes material to be
reengineered and at our command. Even with this being so, it still might be said that
DNA remains the basis for life. However, following Heidegger’s response to the change
in character o f the Rhine, DNA is only the basis for life insofar as it is an object on call
for inspection by a research group ordered there by the medical industry. By changing
the way of revealing through technology, we alter the semantic relationship between
DNA and ourselves.
The lingering question as to why we pursue the genome project seems to find an
answer within the technological enterprise. With genetic technology, we are able to bring
DNA under our control by setting DNA aside as a resource. But the essence of modem
technology as a challenging revealing explains only half the answer. It explains how
technology is related to DNA, but it does not fully explain how humans are then related
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to technology. We must establish this relation if we are to complete the link between
humans and their DNA.
For Heidegger, humans and technology are necessarily linked, but not in a
common-sensical way. We might think that technology is dependent upon humans to
invent and create it, but the essence of technology is actually the opposite. Humans are
dependent upon technology as a fundamental way of being. We are talking about the
essence of technology, and this essence calls us to set upon nature and challenge forth the
real as an ordered resource. This essence of technology he calls Enframing, and asserts it
as a primal disposition o f humans. The essence of technology connects to something
more primitive within human motivation: it sends humans upon a way to order the real as
a resource. This sending upon a way is what Heidegger calls a destining.
By invoking the idea of destiny, Heidegger leaves us thinking that technology
determines our course of action, namely ordering reality into a resource. We are left as
slaves to some mystical notion o f fulfilling the will of Enframing. Enframing as the
essence o f technology thus “threatens to sweep man away into ordering as the supposed
single way of revealing, and so thrusts man into the danger of the surrender of his free
essence” (32). We are threatened in two ways. First, as humans go along their way of
ordering objects into resources, they will increasingly find themselves amidst a world of
objectlessness. Everywhere humans go, things will seem to be mere artifacts; they will
experience only their own presence. Ultimately, the disposition to Enframe must then
turn inward and order humans themselves as resources. Second, Enframing as a
destining limits humans to only that kind o f revealing that is an ordering into a resource.
Although Enft^ming reveals in one sense, it simultaneously conceals revealing as poiesis.
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In its quest for order, it blocks out the bringing-forth into presence o f an object. As the
essence o f an object is that which presences, and truth is found when essences are
brought forth. Enframing thus blocks the coming of truth. When we pursue revealing as
Enframing, we thereby distract ourselves from the coming to pass o f truth (26-27).
We can see both of these dangers within the Human Genome Project, which has
turned the scientifrc gaze inward to unlock the secrets o f human biology. We are
sequencing the nucleotide bases o f our DNA, and setting aside these ordered packages of
genes so that we can use them at our discretion. We extract them, store them, recombine
them, and redistribute them as resources. But in this process of challenging forth the
DNA, science has occluded the beauty o f DNA as it presences itself. We have lost the
wonder that we first felt when the structure and processes of DNA were discovered. And
the efficiency of replication, transcription, and translation no longer inspire us. Instead,
the structure and processes of DNA are things to be manipulated. Any mistakes (and
even some o f the successes) made by the DNA are things to be corrected. The brute
explanatoiy force o f Enframing drowns out the subtle blooming forth of truth.
So is this our fate? Is it to live in a world where objects do not make themselves
present, but are instead set aside as resources for us? It may be the greatest danger to
accept that we are determined by technology. But although humans cannot escape the
primal condition o f being sent forth into revealing, this destining is not a compelling
force for preordained action. Within the realm of destining, we find ourselves truly free.
We can choose which type o f revealing we will embark upon, revealing as a challenging
forth or as a blooming forth. So although Enframing threatens to lead us away from the
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blossoming o f truth, we are not resigned to follow blindly or to struggle helplessly
against it (25-26).
VI. Finding Meaning in Genetic Information
The relationship between humans and technology thus seems to be one where
modem technology sends humans on a way of revealing the world in which they live.
Technology influences the ways in which humans experience the world. As beings in the
world, we must undertake the revealing of essences. But then this revealing of essences
is nothing but a search for meaning. According to Heidegger, when we search for the
essence o f something, we are inquiring into its truth, which is how an object presents
itself to us. We inquire as to the meaning of the object. As part o f the equation o f truth, a
subject must experience a coming to presence of the object. Only within this experience
do objects come to have meaning for us. We must make sense out o f the objects of our
experience, but the question as to how we make sense of our experience remains.
Just as there are two ways of the coming to presence o f a thing, as a challenging
forth and as blossoming forth, so there are two ways in which we make sense of our
experience. Revealing as challenging into a resource sets aside an object as something
immediately at hand. It is there to be manipulated upon demand, and used as a means to
achieve something else. The object as a standing reserve only has relevance in advancing
some other end, which is only to say that it has instrumental meaning. In using modem
technology to view humans on a microscopic scale, we predispose ourselves to revealing
only instrumental meaning. Revealing as a challenging thus limits the extent to which
meaning can be presented to us, for with instrumental meaning, the semantic energy runs
only from us to objects. We impart meaning upon things.
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We have seen that at the microscopic level, DNA has no meaning in itself. Once
a researcher undertakes the investigation of DNA, we give instrumental meaning to it.
With microscopic technology, the researcher challenges forth the DNA as a resource to
be manipulated when she deems necessary. But at the same time, this revealing as
resource clouds the presencing of the DNA itself, by which DNA shows us its true
essence and illuminates its final meaning.
In contrast to instrumental meaning, whose semantic energy flows from subject to
object, there is also meaning that flows from object to subject. It is this type o f meaning
that connects subjects to their surroundings, shapes their experiences, and thus shapes
their identities. Because o f this deep connection to our identities and the way we
experience the world, I call this final meaning. In the blooming forth o f things into
presence before us, things impress meaning upon us. The coming to presence as a
blooming forth of an object allows us to experience the final meaning o f that object.
There is something more poetic and primal to an object than what is revealed by ordering
it into a resource. When we abandon attempts to order the object, the object will bring to
our experience the beauty o f its presence. The coming into beauty of an object is an end
in itself, and impresses upon us its final meaning.
So when we experience the world as revealing, humans have a choice as to which
direction the semantic meaning will flow. If we choose to mediate our experience
through modem technology, we are predisposing ourselves toward revealing as a
resource and imparting scientific meaning to things. This is not to say that we cannot
appreciate the blooming forth o f DNA, but it does make it more difficult. It is difficult
because technology magnifies and amplifies our senses to a different scale. To
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experience the world at this micro scale is to experience a world in which we do not live
or have background experience. Because we do not know what it is like to experience
the world at this scale, the blossoming into presence goes largely unrecognized. Instead,
we attempt to assimilate our perceptions o f the foreign scale into an order that we do
recognize. This altered form of our perceptions then loses its connection to the world in
which the objects o f our perception present themselves. We can only experience a
microscopic thing by assimilating it to the scale in which we live. Because we extract the
thing from its scale to ours, we create a void of meaning as it loses connection to its
microscopic environment. We must therefore impart meaning upon it to fill the void. It
is this response that develops into our disposition to order technologically mediated
reality into a resource.
Meaning is therefore dependent upon scale. When we experience the world at the
scale in which we live, the presencing o f objects make sense, without having to order
them in some way. By experiencing DNA at the microscopic scale, we experience DNA
as an ordering because it is the only way we can make sense o f it. Therefore, the only
meaning that DNA can have for us is vdiat I have termed instrumental meaning. It has no
bearing upon final meaning, as we do not experience DNA in the way we experience the
world. We experience and have evolved to experience the world o f things unmediated by
modem technology.
So with this understanding of instrumental and final meaning, let us return to the
practical problem with vriiich I first identified the distinction between the two senses of
meaning. Should Native American tribes concern themselves with the results o f the
genetic anthropological study? The answer is both yes and no. It remains a danger to
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made all the more real, considering humans’ disposition toward confusing the two, when
our experience is mediated by modem technology. Therefore, Native Americans must
concern themselves with the practical dangers o f confusing instrumental meaning with
final meaning. However, if Native Americans remember that the meaning of genetic
information is limited to instrumental meaning, and that they receive fundamental
meaning from their experiences of the world around them, then genetic information poses
no threat to cultural or personal identities. Even if there is overwhelming evidence that
all groups o f humans originated in Eastern Africa, the cultural and personal experiences
that have developed their identities and connections to a specific locale remain.
As beings that experience the world as revealing, we must consciously work to
exercise our fi’eedom in deciding when it is appropriate to order the world and when is it
better to receive the presencing of the world. The challenge that faces not only Native
Americans, but all humans, is how to practically apply the scientific knowledge that
orders our world in such a way that the beauty o f the world is not concealed, but rather,
bursts forth. By fostering a world that bursts forth into bloom, we foster our connection
with the world. Genetic information will never be able to tell us who we are or what we
should be; these questions can only be answered at the scale in which we live. Genetic
information is something to which we give meaning. But we must make sure that the
meaning we impart to it is consonant with the final meaning that gives purpose to our
lives. Although opinions differ on what exactly constitutes this final meaning, it is clear
that we cannot find the answers through a microscope. We must focus ourselves upon
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21 arriving at some consensus regarding who we are before we can wisely decide what to do
with genetic information.
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Challenges to Securing Genetic Privacy
I.

Introduction
Current efforts to protect the genetic privacy of persons have been focused upon

restricting access to a person’s genome —the full sequence o f nucleic acids that prescribe
certain physical characteristics of individuals. Fears o f genetic discrimination are
justified given past practices by insurers and employers that have denied coverage or
employment to individuals based upon criteria derived from a person’s genome.
However, in the race to regulate access to genetic information, several confusions have
arisen which mitigate against the success of anti-discriminatory measures. In this paper, I
will clarify two crucial distinctions that are implicated in the protection of genetic
privacy. First, the term ‘genetic information’ is often misconstrued to refer only to the
genome, which has recently become accessible through new technology. But there
remains another type o f genetic information, the phenotype, which has always been
accessible to our gaze, and eludes current anti-discrimination efforts. Second, since the
right to privacy is not an enumerated right in the U.S. Constitution, this discovered right
has also been mistaken to be a monolithic entity. However, as legal scholarship
demonstrates, there are actually two forms o f the right to privacy: one governing the
access of information and the other guaranteeing certain zones of privacy in which to
make autonomous decisions. Application o f the nuances o f privacy law to the richer
notion o f genetic information thus presents a more complex situation for the protection of
genetic privacy. By respecting the intricacies of genetic privacy laid out in this paper, we
shall see that privacy law is limited in its ability to protect persons from all genetic
discrimination. But these limitations do not call for the abandonment of efforts to protect
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genetic privacy. Rather, they merely signal that we must consign certain areas o f genetic
privacy to ethical rules of conduct as opposed to forcing all protections to be legal. It is
through an appeal to the ethical underpinnings of privacy that a resolution to genetic
discrimination may be found.
II.

Two Types of Genetic Information
As we interact with one another on a daily basis, we unwittingly have access to

one type o f genetic information. At a glance, we can discern certain genetic
characteristics of the person who we walk past on the street. Their sex, their skin color,
their height, and, if natural, their hair color are all manifestations of that person’s genome
and readily observable. This type o f genetic information has been coined the phenotype
of a person. The phenotype is the observable expression o f genes and it is the form of
genetic information that is most familiar to us, although often not recognized as having
genetic implications.
The underlying genetic structure that is expressed as the phenotype is called the
genotype. The ‘instructions’ for human development are encoded in some 100,000
genes. The genotype is that specific sequence of nucleic acids that make a particular
gene, and ultimately, a particular human unique. At the level o f daily social intercourse,
the genotype is hidden from us, and has historically been unavailable to us.' But with the
techniques of modem genetics, our genes, and the sequence of nucleic acids that
constitute them, are no longer necessarily hidden. We are able to uniquely identify
persons through DNA fingerprinting, as well as identify abnormalities in the genetic

‘in this paper, I will be referring specifically to molecular as opposed to allelic genotypes. While allelic
genotypes have been known since the 19***century, our current understanding of molecular genotypes
provides us with a more detailed access to the underlying genetic structure.
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sequence through testing of tissue samples. It is the advent o f our ability to ‘see’ the
genetic make-up that has sparked the call for genetic privacy.
Following the completion o f the Human Genome Project in 2003, it is possible
that the genotype of every gene in the human body could become subject to scrutiny.
The entire sequence o f nucleic acids that has been concealed for so long will finally come
under our gaze. From the front page of the newspaper to the President’s State of the
Union Address, the promise o f this ability has captivated the public’s imagination.
Underlying the excitement surrounding knowledge o f genotypes is the notion that
through an understanding of the molecular basis of genes, we can manipulate and control
the genome to achieve certain prescribed results. Undoubtedly, genetic research and
technology will provide needed relief to those suffering from severe genetic maladies.
Medical doctors are already testing gene therapies that will correct diseased genes. But
these advances in genetic technology and medicine necessarily introduce the availability
of genotypic information into a society unfamiliar with the power o f genetic information.
Because a person’s genotype becomes available through this new technology, a series of
legal and moral implications are introduced as well.
Once genotypic information is available, i.e. once the sequence of nucleic acids is
recorded, access to this information becomes a key question. If knowledge is indeed
power, then whoever has knowledge o f a person’s genome has a unique power over that
person. When employers or insurance companies obtain this genotypic information, they
also obtain power over that individual - the power to deny coverage or employment. The
availability o f genotypic information should thus be seen as a new possibility to rigidify
power structures within society and perpetuate certain practices of discrimination and
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oppressioa The reality of this possibility is supported by the history of discrimination
based upon the other type o f genetic information: the phenotype.^
Since phenotypes are the observable expressions o f the genotype, it is quite
possible, and seemingly natural, to make judgments/evaluations of others based upon
their particular expression o f their genes. We tend to shy away from confrontations with
persons o f large stature and assert ourselves when the difference is to our advantage.
Like genotypic information, phenotypic information can be used in wonderful ways.
Phenotypes provide us with basic information necessary to organize the altos and
sopranos in a harmonious quartet or to position players on a successful football team.
However, while these evaluations can be used to celebrate the uniqueness o f individuals,
phenotypes can also be the basis for the denigration o f persons. Over the course o f the
history of phenotypic evaluations, we, as a society, have favored certain phenotypes over
others, i.e. male over female, fair skin over dark. These phenotypic differences have then
been used to justify preferential treatment toward individuals with the favored
phenotypes. Evaluations o f this sort have thus instantiated systems of oppression and
discrimination, whether they be overt, as in slavery, or covert, as in opportunities
available to women.
If we are to understand the threat o f genetic discrimination, we must understand
the parallel between genotypic and phenotypic discrimination. While the emergence of
genotypic information presents challenges for the protection of persons, the challenges
are not new. Discrimination based upon phenotype is as old as societal interaction. The
attention given to genetic information qua genotype thus provides an opportunity to

See Kevles for a histoiy of eugenic discrimination in early 20“*century America and Britain.
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coirect old injustices based on phenotype as well as to address the challenges peculiar to
genotypic information.

in.

The Right to Privacy
One o f the key tenets of liberal democracies like the United States is the

(protection o f persons from unwarranted intrusions into their private lives. If we are to
understand how the right to privacy can act to protect persons with respect to their
genetic information, we must delineate the two distinct strands of privacy. Through a
historical analysis o f the ‘discovery’ o f the right to privacy, I hope to illustrate how the
two strands o f privacy can act to mitigate the use o f genetic information in restricting the
fundamental freedoms o f persons.
As a matter of general legal interpretation, there are two types o f rights in the U.S.
Constitution. Enumerated rights are those explicitly stated in the Amendments o f the
Constitution, i.e. tte rights to a free press, free speech, and the free exercise o f religion.
Although these rights still require judicial interpretation as to their particular meaning and
bearing within certain contexts, their status as strong rights is uncontested. The right to
privacy is not such a right; it is an unenumerated right discovered in the Constitution.
The very existence o f this right is a matter of judicial interpretation. But over a series of
Supreme Court decisions, the right to privacy now enjoys a secure place among our
fundamental rights.
The U.S. Supreme Court first recognized the right to privacy in 1965 with the
decision in Griswold v. Connecticut. At issue in this case was the state’s ability to
infringe upon the liberties of persons under the substantive due process clause o f the
Amendment. Connecticut had passed a state statute that criminalized the use of

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

-28-

contraceptives. In his majority opinion, Justice Douglas argued that the term ‘liberty’ in
the due process clause should be interpreted as meaning the fundamental liberties of
persons, and followed that the right to privacy is one such liberty. In support of this right,
Douglas appealed to the “penumbras” o f several of the enumerated rights, suggesting that
the right to privacy is the underlying foundation for our set of enumerated Constitutional
protections. This discovered right to privacy, in combination with the 14* Amendment,
was then used to strike down the Connecticut statute.
In arguing for the right to privacy as a fundamental liberty. Justice Douglas
pursued two lines of reasoning, ostensibly meant to establish the same right. However,
each line of argument has come to be understood as a distinct prong of the right to
privacy. Justice Douglas first argued that if persons are to be able to exercise their
fundamental liberties, there must be certain “zones o f privacy” in which persons are free
from state intrusion. Within this private sphere, persons are free to make the decisions
that will affect their lives. Douglas’ first argument has come to be understood as
establishing our right to make autonomous decisions.
In his second line o f reasoning, Douglas appeals to the decision in NAACP v.
Alabama, which ruled that the state o f Alabama could not require the state chapter o f the
National Association for the Advancement o f Colored Persons to disclose its membership
lists. Requiring the disclosure o f these lists violated the members’ right to free
association, and hidden within this right was a protection of the privacy of those
individuals. But the privacy being protected was not the privacy to make autonomous
decisions for which he had earlier argued. Instead, there seemed to be an implicit
understanding that in publicizing the membership lists, the state was subjecting the
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members to unwarranted, and perhaps hostile, scrutiny by the public given the social
climate o f Alabama in the late 1950’s. In order to protect persons from the hostile gaze
of the public, Douglas argued that the Court must protect the information used to subject
persons to scrutiny. The unwarranted disclosure of personal information was thus a
violation o f the right to privacy; it was the right o f persons to decide who has access to
one s personal information. Although it seems clear that Justice Douglas intended that
his second argument support his first, we now understand his reasoning to establish a
distinct right to privacy: the right to informational privacy.
The foundations o f the two prongs o f privacy, autonomy and informational, were
thus established in the Supreme Court decision o f Griswold v. Connecticut, but because
of Douglas’ muddled arguments, the right to privacy remained an ill-defined concept. It
was only through a series o f later cases that the right to privacy was refined into its
distinct strands. I will follow the evolution o f each strand separately, noting its
developments and presenting the current understanding of both prongs so that the
application to genetic privacy will follow naturally.
Douglas’ argument establishing “zones o f privacy” and protecting the right to
make autonomous decisions was, for the most part, unambiguous. Therefore, the
development o f this right has less to do with clarifying and refining the constitutional
guarantee of autonomy than o f determining the limits of its protections. The extent to
which the state can pursue the general welfare against the fundamental liberties of
persons is a common theme within constitutional democracies. In the case o f autonomy,
the Supreme Court has had to weigh a person’s right to make decisions without the
intrusion o f state regulation against the state’s legitimate role o f protecting persons from
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harm. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this debate has been focused upon the right o f autonomy
in medical decision-making.
One of the most famous attempts by the Court to define the limits o f the
autonomy prong of privacy came with the decision in Cruzan v. Dir., Missouri Dept, o f
Health. In the early 1980’s, a young woman, Nancy Cruzan, was in a car accident.
Paramedics resuscitated her, but the lack o f oxygen left her in a coma. Despite appeals
by parents and friends that Nancy would wish to be taken off o f nutrition and hydration
support, the Missouri Department o f Health would not withdraw the feeding tubes. After
8 years of legal appeals, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the Cruzan family and
mandated that the equipment be withdrawn. Through its decision, the Court strengthened
the right of privacy qua autonomy finding that the individual’s right to refuse medical
treatment trumped the state’s duty to provide for the health o f its citizens.
The autonomy o f persons would receive its most explicit formulation in
Washington v. Glucksberg. In this case, the underlying issue was physician-assisted
suicide, a matter that perfectly illustrates the conflict between individual autonomy and
the state’s role o f protecting persons from harm. The State of Washington çnacted
legislation that made it illegal to assist in another person’s suicide. In response to this
statute, a group o f physicians who regularly treat terminally ill patients sued the State,
claiming that they would violate the law if asked by their patients and the severity of the
situation called for such a humanitarian act. In her concurring opinion. Justice O’ Connor
clarified the right o f privacy qua autonomy as “the individual’s right to make certain
unusually important decisions that will affect his own, or his family’s, destiny”, and
protects those matters “central to personal dignity ” (Glucksberg 2307). But ultimately.

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

-31 -

the Court found in favor o f the State o f Washington, that the statute outlawing physicianassisted suicide was within its 14* Amendment powers. The Court argued that the right
o f autonomy can be limited if the state had a "compelling state interest,” and thus,
physician-assisted suicide was not protected by the right to privacy given the state’s
compelling interest in guarding against the involuntary hastening of death.
Interestingly, just as the refinement o f the right to privacy qua autonomy evolved
through a string o f medically related cases, so can the development o f informational
[Hivacy be traced through issues surrounding medicine. In 1977, the Supreme Court
revisited the question of the disclosure of personal information with the case Whalen v.
Roe. The State o f New York passed a statute requiring that the dispensing o f potentially
harmful drugs be registered with the State Health Department in order to prevent creating
a market for these drugs through over-prescription, multiple fillings, and obtaining
prescriptions from multiple doctors. Patients who regularly received these drugs and
doctors who regularly prescribed th an contested the constitutionality o f the statute as
invading the “zones of privacy” protected by the right to privacy qua autonomy. They
did not specifically argue for the right to informational privacy. The confusion that
attended the argument o f the appellees in Whalen v. Roe is thus a prime example o f die
need to separate the prongs o f privacy, and explicate their respective domains.
Justification for the right to informational privacy, or selective disclosure of
infonnation, is found in the need to have certain aspects o f our lives ftee from the public
gaze. Although this may entail demarcating certain “zones” that are strictly private, what
is essential to these zones, i.e. what these zones are meant to protect, is the personal

R ep ro d u ced with p erm ission o f th e copyright ow ner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout perm ission.

-32-

infonnation that may be used by the public to limit our other liberties. The control of
personal information is thus essential in order to protect our basic liberties.
So when the physicians and patients contested the New York statute, they were
essentially concerned with the restriction of other basic liberties that would attend the
mandatory disclosure of this information. The appellees legitimately argued that the
statute required the release o f private medical information that could potentially subject
both physicians and patients to public scrutiny. Concern for their reputations might have
disposed some patients to refuse beneficial medications and may have rendered doctors
reluctant to prescribe drugs that fall under the criteria o f the statute. However, the
argument brought to the Court (and eventually accepted by the Court) was that the New
York statute was an infringement o f autonomy, not o f the selective disclosure o f private
information. The confusion within this argument is illuminated by the fact that the State
o f New York was not making important decisions for the physicians and patients, as was
evident in the case of physician-assisted suicide. The State only required the individuals
to register their decisions with a state agency. Instead o f appealing to the right of
autonomy, the appellee’s argument provided support for the security o f personal
information and the r i ^ t to engage in activities free from the judgment o f others. To
understand the New York statute as a breach o f autonomy was to stretch the meaning of
autonomy to the general idea o f liberty, and thus, to lose its usefulness in making
distinctions within our rights o f privacy (Huff 793).
Whether or not a clarirication o f the two prongs o f privacy would have had a
bearing on the outcome o f the case is a matter o f debate. But it seems likely that a more
explicit appeal to informational privacy would not have been enough to sway the Court in
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favor o f the appellees. The Court ruled that the statute requiring the registration o f
certain drugs with a state health agency was a reasonable exercise in maintaining public
health, and that this interest superceded the right o f patients and physicians to avoid
“disclosure of personal matters” {Whalen 599).
However, the right to informational privacy received a crucial refinement by the
Second Circuit o f Appeals in Doe v. City o f New York. The issue facing the Court o f
Appeals was the degree to wiiich certain forms of medical information were strictly
personal. In this case. Doe had filed a discrimination claim based upon his
homosexuality and positive HIV status to the City o f New York Commission on Human
Rights. The commission later released information regarding Doe’s HTV status to the
press, subjecting him to the possibility o f discrimination by his employer, co-workers,
and insurance company. Although the state had a legitimate interest in accessing this
information, given the infectious nature of the disease, the Court of Appeals found that
the state should not have had access to this medical information. Because o f the uniquely
personal nature o f the information, the individual’s right not to be scrutinized trumped the
state’s public health interest calling for the disclosure o f the information. The key factor
that allowed the selective disclosure o f information to override the state’s health interest
was thus the uniquely personal nature o f the medical information.
These court cases reveal the two distinct strands o f privacy that protect two
distinct domains of privacy. The right to privacy qua autonomy guarantees our right to
make the fundamental decisions that affect our lives and dignity, especially in the most
intimate spheres of our lives. On the other hand, the right to informational privacy
protects us from unwarranted observation, and therefore, evaluation by others. In
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combination, these two domains o f privacy act to secure the fundamental liberties of
persons, so that we are able to pursue our interests without the undue interference of
others. But this analysis o f the right to privacy has also elucidated another issue that is
pertinent to the application of privacy to the concerns surrounding genetic information.
In the discussion of both strands o f privacy, the interests o f the state offer certain
limitations to the protection o f privacy. As we consider the right to genetic privacy, we
must keep in mind the lessons learned in the analysis of privacy. A person’s right to
privacy is not absolute; compelling state interests can restrict it. The interesting questions
are thus when and how.
IV.

The Right to Genetic Privacy
The application o f the right to privacy to genetic information can be divided into

two main concerns, roughly corresponding to the two prongs o f privacy. First, the
availability o f genetic information immediately exposes uniquely personal information
about persons to the evaluation o f others. Second, the state has a demonstrated interest in
public health, militating against the individual’s right to make decisions based upon their
genetic infonnation. In this section, I will consider these two issues separately, outlining
the various issues that arise, and will conclude, in the final section, with suggestions as to
how to interpret the confluence o f the two prongs o f privacy with the two types of genetic
information.
Genetic Informational Privacv
As the decision in Doe v. City o f New York demonstrates, in order for medical
information to be protected under the right to privacy, it must be of a uniquely personal
nature, i.e. the release of such material must directly threaten to limit a person’s
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fundamental liberties. Likewise, if genetic information is to be protected, we should be
able to show how genetic information is uniquely personal, and thus how any
unwarranted release of genetic information renders persons exposed to scrutiny by the
public. There are three ways in which genetic information is uniquely personal. First, a
person’s genome can predict an individual’s likely medical future for a variety o f
conditions. This ability to predict likely medical problems has likened the genome to a
“future diary,” a concept that we will explore shortly. Second, genetic information
implicates the genetic status o f persons other than the individual to which the information
directly refers, namely biological parents, siblings, and children. Released information
can thus subject uninvolved persons to public scrutiny and a limitation of their rights.
And third, genetic information has historically been used to stigmatize and victimize
persons (Annas 360). Expounding upon each one of these reasons separately, I hope to
demonstrate that without a doubt, genetic information is uniquely personal information,
and thus, requires protection under the informational strand o f privacy.
The enterprise of medical research occupies itself with establishing the causation
o f disease. Once the causal link is identified, treatments, therapies, and behaviors can
then be modified to eliminate, mitigate, or avoid the causes o f disease. However, genetic
diseases currently present quite a conundrum to the enterprise o f medicine. Researchers
are often able to identify the diseased, or abnormal, gene that causes the particular
disease, but too often this diagnosis produces little that can be used to treat the disease.^
The affected individual thus is aware of a scenario that will likely play itself out in the

^ There are many efforts that are now using genetic techniques to rid persons of ‘bad genes,’ and some of
these efforts have had celebrated success, even more showing promise. But it still remains that there are
more identifiable genetic diseases than curable genetic diseases.
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fiiture, but may be paralyzed from doing anything to alter its probability, time o f onset, or
severity. For this reason, information about one’s genome has been called oiœ’s “future
diary” (Annas 360).
Consider the example of Huntington’s Disease, a harrowing affliction striking
most often during one’s 40’s or 50’s. Once popularly known as Huntington’s Chorea
because o f the wild involuntary movements associated with the disease, this genetic
disease leads to a slow deterioration of mental abilities, i.e. intelligence, emotional
control, balance and speech. Since the Huntington’s gene is a single dominant gene,
children of an affected parent have a 50% chance o f also expressing the disease. With
the availability o f a genetic test to ictentify the presence o f this gene, children can know,
with h i ^ probability, whether or not they will suffer the same fate as their parent. If the
test returns positive, the scenario o f deterioration that crippled the life of their mother or
father morbidly awaits the child. Although treatment in this area is progressing, there is
little, if anything, that such a person can do to alter the course of the disease, yet they
must anxiously live the next twenty or so years before any symptoms begin to appear.
The uniquely personal nature o f genetic information can be illustrated through the
concerns o f a diagnosed individual. Knowledge o f one’s diseased genetic status can cut
deep into the self-perception o f persons. Akin to the sense of moral powerlessness felt by
the ancient Greeks in the face o f Moira, or Fate, persons are often powerless to alter the
course o f their disease, leaving them grasping to understand their situation. They may
come to wonder if they somehow deserve such a disease, that they are somehow less
worthy of a full life. Beyond such anxious thoughts, affected persons must contemplate
how the disease will affect their life plans. And to aggravate the sheer gravity o f coping
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with such news, they must worry about how they will be received by society, if they will
be subject to discrimination, and whether the liberties they have so enjoyed might be
limited given this new knowledge. If the information were to reach their insurance
companies, what kind o f coverage would be available to them, and at what price? And if
their employers were to obtain this information, what future do they have in their careers?
Such possible restrictions on a person’s liberties necessitate understanding genetic
information as a highly personal form of information, and thus clamor for protection
under the right to informational privacy.
The second reason that genetic information is uniquely personal has already been
intimated in the discussion o f the first reason Because genes are hereditary, certain
anomalies in one’s genome imply a probability that the same anomaly will be present in
the genomes of biological relatives. The aforementioned concerns that arise for those
persons directly affected, both existential and practical, also affect family members.
Although the right to informational privacy can do nothing to protect persons and their
families from the reality o f the disease, it can do much to protect them from the
possibility of scrutiny and discrimination based upon the disease.
One concern that separates the position of the positively diagnosed from the
position of family members is the knowledge that one will express the particular genetic
disease. Whereas diagnosed persons already know their status and must begin coping
with their situations, the confirmed status of family members is unknown, necessitating a
different kind of coping. Especially in cases where no cure currently exists, the
knowledge o f one’s probability of expressing a genetic disease, yet not knowing for sure
if one’s future has a diseased script, is undoubtedly a daunting state o f existence. Does
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one take a genetic test to confirm or eliminate the probability? Or is it better to live one’s
life ignorant of one’s future health? (This unique position o f family members raises
further issues regarding the right to privacy, such as the right not to know one’s status vs.
a duty to know, but this discussion will be better served within the context o f autonomy,
which we shall explore shortly.)
But before we consider the prong of privacy qua autonomy, let us first address the
final reason that genetic information is o f a highly personal nature: genetic information
has historically been used to stigmatize and victimize individuals. In a famous 1927
Supreme Court case. Buck v. Bell, the enforced sterilization o f persons thought to carry
‘bad genes’ was ruled constitutional. A young woman, Carrie Buck, herself bom o f a
mentally deficient mother, gave birth to a daughter while institutionalized at the Virginia
Colony for Epileptics and Feebleminded. The ruling of the Supreme Court permitted the
state to pursue their eugenic program in the name o f public health, ending with the statesanctioned sterilization of Ms. Buck. In his opinion. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
uttered the famous eugenic words, “[t]hree generations o f imbeciles are enough” {Buck
201-202). Tragically, the daughter of Carrie Buck later showed signs of being especially
bright before her death from an intestinal disorder in the second grade (Kevles 112).
Institutional discrimination such as that illustrated in the case o f Buck v. Bell has
largely been eliminated since the heyday of the social eugenics movement in the first
thirty-five years of the 20* century. However, discrimination based upon genetic
information continues to threaten persons in two ways. First, as I have alluded to above,
employers and insurance companies have large incentives to deny employment or
coverage to individuals known to carry a genetic disease. Training employees costs
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companies large amounts o f time and money. If persons known to be turnover risks can
be weeded out in the hiring process, the company can maintain a more efficient
workforce, saving dollars in the long term. Likewise, if insurance companies can identify
current or prospective clients as high risks, they too can financially benefit from genetic
information. Depending on the severity o f the genetic disease, premiums could be
adjusted to account for expected medical care, or coverage could be denied altogether.
Either way, those individuals who most need the protection will either be without
insurance or forced to pay incredible premiums to receive coverage. The threat of
discrimination against those carrying abnormal genes will only be exasperated by current
trends in the insurance industry, which are steadily shifting from a community rating
system to a system based upon individual risk and experience, without making the
distinction between voluntary and involuntary risks (W olf347).
The other area in which discrimination threatens the freedoms of persons is in the
area o f reproductive rights. As the case o f Buck v. Bell demonstrates, the right to bear
children can be withdrawn if genes deemed unworthy are likely to be passed on. But
Buck V . Bell is not merely an antiquated court case, remaining only as an aberration in the
history of jurisprudence. Twenty-four states still have sterilization laws in effect, albeit
highly regulated (Kevles 111). That such laws exist attests to the threat against personal
liberties created by the institutional bias against persons with genetic maladies. Given the
degree to which this discrimination has limited the freedoms of persons, the highly
personal nature o f genetic information must be asserted to protect persons from harmful
uses o f their genetic information.
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The successful application o f the right o f informational privacy to genetic
information hinges upon its uniquely personal nature. As the case o f Doe v. City o f New
York suggests, in order for genetic information to be secure against the state's interest in
pursuing public health, there must be a demonstrable threat to the restriction of a person’s
fundamental liberties. In fleshing out three reasons why genetic information is of such a
uniquely personal nature and why unregulated access to it poses such a threat to liberty, I
hope to have secured the information of one’s genome under the guaranteed right to
informational privacy. We can now turn to the issues surrounding the application of
privacy qua autonomy to genetic information.
Issues of Autonomv in Decisions Regarding Genetic Information
T h ro u ^ our discussion o f court cases, we have refined the right to privacy qua
autonomy as protecting those important decisions that will affect our, or our family’s, life
plans. But as we have noted, this right is not absolute and can be limited by compelling
state interests. The interesting questions that surround the application o f privacy qua
autonomy to issues involving genetic information thus arise at the intersection of the
state’s compelling interests and the individual’s right to make autonomous decisions. In
this subsection, I will explicate the opposing interests in issues of personal autonomy in
order to provide a framework by which to understand and engage in the numerous
debates that attend the issue o f personal autonomy in decisions regarding genetic
information.
Public health, including the health o f future persons, is the most often cited state
interest that challenges individual autonomy. If we are to understand how personal
autonomy can be limited by the interests of public health, we must first grasp the basic
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nature of genetic diseases. Because all genetic diseases display some pattern of
inheritance, it is, in principle, possible to eradicate them through manipulation of
reproductive behavior. It would then be consistent with the state’s interest to pursue
programs which aim to bring about this elimination of disease. But a key component o f
any program that attempts to eliminate genetic disease through manipulation o f patterns
o f inheritance must alter reproductive habits. One method of covertly achieving this end
is through a “duty to know” (Laurie 91-93). It is argued that if persons know the high
probability o f passing on a genetic disease to their children, they will readily alter their
reproductive behavior. The state thus achieves the change in behavior necessary to break
the patterns of inheritance through the decisions o f individual persons.
However, several difficulties challenge the establishment of any duty to know.
First, there are practical objections to the effectiveness o f this duty. Knowledge o f one’s
genetic status does not guarantee that persons will in fact alter their reproductive behavior
(Laurie 92). Second, certain constitutional questions might be raised, i.e. personal or
religious beliefs may keep persons from taking birth control, having a selective abortion,
or even accepting the goal o f the public health program. And as Roe v. Wade
demonstrates, there is good reason to believe that the limiting o f an existing person’s
rights does not supercede the rights o f future persons to good health (Laurie 93). Third,
we must ask whether the very establishment of a duty to know infringes upon the rights
o f persons. In direct opposition to the duty to know, there exists a good argument for the
establishment of a right not to know one’s genetic status. Whereas the duty to know
finds its justification in the state’s interest to secure the general health o f its citizens, the
right not to know is grounded in the interests o f individuals, expressed specifically in the
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the right to privacy, then a duty to know is unacceptable.
Let us thus turn to the interests o f persons with regard to genetic information to
provide a check against the public health interests o f the state. In the earlier discussion of
informational privacy, I referred to the unique position o f the family members o f persons
carrying diseased genes. As opposed to their relative who is already known to have a
hereditary genetic disease, family members have a choice whether or not they wish to
know their own genetic status. Given the psychological and social burdens that
accompany such knowledge, it is reasonable to accept that implicated family members
may wish not to know. Such a desire to remain in ignorance is all the more reasonable
considering that often no cure or preventative treatment is available.
The issue here is not whether the implicated individual should want to know or
not want to know; the issue is that it is not the state’s responsibility to decide this for the
individual. To reiterate Justice O’ Coimor’s words in Glucksberg v. Washington, “it is
the individuai's right to make certain unusually important decisions that will affect his
own, or his family’s, destiny” [emphasis added] {Glucksberg 2307). We have already
demonstrated the importance o f this decision as well as the extent to which the decision
will affect one’s coping with their genetic destiny. The right to make this autonomous
decision must remain with the individual. Relatives o f a person known to carry an
inherited genetic disease might unavoidably know in the abstract that there is a possibility
o f their expressing the same disease, but they can choose not to know in the concrete
(Laurie 91). Since this right not to know finds protection under the right to privacy qua
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autonomy, public health initiatives attempting to establish a duty to know must be
avoided.
Both prongs o f privacy thus provide strong protection for the fundamental
liberties o f persons in genetic contexts. We have seen that informational privacy secures
persons from the unwarranted gaze o f the public, which can subject them to
discrimination and exploitation based upon their genomes. And we know that the right to
privacy qua autonomy ensures that persons are free to mzdce decisions involving their
genomes. However, there are limits to which the concept o f genetic privacy can protect
persons. Legal protections have focused upon securing genotypic information, i.e.
regulating the collection of samples and information in gene banks, while phenotypic
information has been left unprotected. If we are to take seriously the protection o f
persons with regard to their genetic informaticm, we must consider how privacy interacts
with phenotypic information. We might find that it is not privacy law, but rather the
spirit of privacy that acts to protect persons.
V.

Understanding the Various Arrangements o f Genetic Privacy
I have intentionally refrained from incorporating the distinction between

genotypic and phenotypic information into our discussion o f genetic privacy in order to
avoid confusion in the previous sections. Simplifying the discussion in this way enabled
us to consider the nuances o f privacy without the complicating factor o f the dichotomous
nature of genetic information. But in order to proceed in this manner, it was necessary to
rely heavily on one conception o f genetic information. As may be seen in my analysis of
genetic privacy, I have invoked the genotypic notion of genetic information to illustrate
the problems and issues that arise. I have used the genotypic conception as the default
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understanding largely because it more closely matches our intuitive definition o f genetic
information, and because current legislative efforts tend to only focus upon protecting the
information gleaned firom the genotype. But now that we have laid out the application o f
the two prongs o f privacy to genetic information, we can recast our conclusions in light
o f this a&nission, and then consider the role o f privacy in discussions o f phenotype.
As we have seen, information that is directly derivable from a person’s genome
can be brought under the protection o f the right to privacy in two ways. Genotypic
autonomy concerns itself with decisions regarding the manipulation o f one’s genome.
Areas in which genotypic autonomy might be exercised include the acceptance or
rejection of gene tlwrapy to correct a genetic malady, the desire to pursue cosmetic gene
therapy to enhance certain genetic traits, and finally in reproductive issues such as
selective abortions based upon disease, traits, or even sex. It is the prima facie right o f
persons to make decisions in these areas. As such, the issues that arise in genotypic
contexts parallel those issues in traditional medicine; any infringement upon the right of
genotypic autonomy must demonstrate a compelling state interest.
We also see a parallel between selective disclosure o f genotypic information and
disclosure of other kinds o f medicM information in that both are concerned with access to
the information. But as I have argued, genotypic information is o f a much more intimate
nature, and thus exposes persons to a particularly harmful form o f discrimination. For
this reason, genotypic information requires special recognition and protection under the
right to selective disclosure o f information Attempts have been made to regulate access
to genotypic information, as well as to legislate rules for the cdlection and storage o f
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saraples from which the information is derived/* Bills such as the Genetic Privacy Act
provide a necessary protection against unwarranted access to genotypic information, and
thus, secure persons from discriminatory actions based upon their genomes.
However, critics o f efforts to pass anti-discrimination legislation argue that
subsuming genotypic information under the right to privacy does not go far enough in
protecting persons. Susan Wolf argues that the most serious harm to persons resulting
from access to genotypic information is not discrimination per se, but the identifying of
persons as their genes (346). The anti-discrimination approach assumes that genetic
discrimination is deliberate, ignoring the deeper psychological dimensions like the
stereotypes and prejudices that precede and fuel the drive to discriminate (345). If we are
truly to protect persons from infringements o f their basic liberties, we must also focus
upon treating persons as persons, not as their genes. We need to expand our efforts
beyond protections for genotypic information to include the roots of discrimination that
are found in our daily interactions. We must apply the right o f privacy to phenotypic
information.
Phenotypic information poses a particular problem for privacy law. Since
phenotypes are the observable expressions of the underlying genetic constitution, certain
bits of information are unavoidably exposed to public scrutiny as soon as one enters the
public sphere. Control o f one’s phenotypic information is thus extremely difficult.
However, phenotypic information can be exploited just as easily as genotypic
information. A genetic disease such as Huntington’s disease or Down syndrome
manifests itself in characteristic ways such that an observer need not have any direct

*

See Annas for a foil description of the considerations involved in drafting the Genetic Privacy Act.
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insurance companies could raise premiums on account of the documentation that your
father suffers from Huntington’s disease.
Wolf is correct in stating that we must address these problems, but she is a bit
hasty in dismissing the value o f privacy in curtailing genotypic discrimination. What is
necessary is a clear picture of the differing ways in which the concept of privacy can
assist in protecting persons. When applied to genotypic information, the right to selective
disclosure of information legally secures persons against discrimination based upon their
genomes. In the case o f phenotypic information, legal regulations cannot uproot the
psychological prejudices that drive phenotypic discrimination. The nature of phenotypic
prejudice is too complex to be captured under the auspices o f the law alone. However,
we can appeal to the spirit o f privacy and augment attempts to eliminate phenotypic
prejudice with more discerning ethical arguments. In doing so, the concept of privacy
proves useful in combating both genotypic and phenotypic discrimination.
The spirit of phenotypic privacy may thus be best understood as an ethical
imperative and not merely as a legal imperative. Justice Douglas seemed to have grasped
this point in his majority opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut. In establishing privacy as
the protector of our fundamental liberties, he appealed to the spirit of the Constitution, a
document infused with ethical imperatives. We must carry forth the spirit o f privacy to
areas beyond the reach of formalized law. We must address the most subtle phenotypic
discrimination that occurs in our daily interactions.
The ethical problem of genetic discrimination is not so much that we treat people
differently, but that we see people as their genes. It is the reduction o f persons to their
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constituent genetic material that reinforces and legitimates the unequal treatment o f
persons. There is a belief that the biological nature of genes justifies differential
treatment because it is somehow ‘natural,’ But differential treatment is not justified by
the diversity found amongst human genomes. Since there is no one genome that can be
considered ‘normal’ and used as a standard, differential treatment necessarily
incorporates value judgments as to which genes are &vorable and which genes are
unfavorable. Our attack upon genetic discrimination must thus focus upon the value
judgments that substantiate discriminatory actions.
The resolution o f both genotypic and phenotypic discrimination is grounded in
our view o f persons. We must not see persons as their genes, rather we must see them as
persons, complete with dignity and guaranteed the protection of their fundamental
liberties. We must champion the rights of privacy, both in formal law and in spirit, that
protect these liberties.
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Limitations o f Morality in the Context of Prenatal Genetic Testing
I. Introduction
A hallmark o f contemporary life is the inordinate amount of information that is
available on any subject. It seems natural that, in a deluge o f morally relevant
information, we react by distilling a set o f principles or action guides. However,
following Bernard Williams, I will argue that this tendency to search for a moral system
that will provide unequivocal directives belies the inherent complexities of ethical issues.
In this paper, I will attempt to explicate the thicket of moral issues that are raised by
contemporary biomedical science as it inundates society with new information regarding
prenatal genetic testing. This thicket can be divided into two branches: (1) issues that
arise in the process of informing hopeful parents about the results o f the prenatal test, and
(2) issues that are implicated in the decisions of the parents in response to these results.
Although attempts have been made to bring morality to bear upon prenatal testing, they
have typically addressed only the former branch of the thicket. The latter branch, which
largely contains the more complex and intractable issues, is left untended. I will thus
argue that with respect to the issues implicit in the decisions of parents, our primaiy task
should be to explicate the complexities of the moral dimensions of prenatal testing, not to
establish a moral system to guide the decision. With a clear conception o f the richness of
the moral issues surrounding prenatal testing, the intractable problems will be rendered
more manageable, and the deluge of information less distracting,

n. A Thicket of Moral Issues
For parents who are at risk o f conceiving a child with a harmful and debilitating
disease, the information that is available through genetic testing can provide
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immeasurable peace o f mind. If the results are negative, parents can be reassured that a
particular disease that has tom at the rest of their family will not ravage the health o f their
child. Even if the results of the genetic test are positive, the parents can still benefit from
this information. With advanced screening technologies like chorionic villus sampling,
the genetic status of a fetus can often be determined within the first trimester of
pregnancy, before strong emotional attachments tend to take hold. This gives the parents
time to consider the import o f the test results. They can discuss the quality o f life that the
child would have if brought to term, and they can determine how well situated they are to
provide that life. This allows the parents to either choose to abort the fetus or to prepare,
both emotionally and financially, for the birth o f their child (McCann).
But this scenario describes prenatal testing at its best. In actuality, there are many
complicating factors which make gaining genetic information about one’s child not so
serene and idyllic. There are many contingencies that complicate the decision. In
choosing to have the tests, parents must be concerned about the welfare of the fetus. In
the common prenatal test amniocentesis, a long needle is inserted into the abdomen of the
mother to collect a sample o f the amniotic fluid, by which cells of the fetus can be
isolated and tested. There is an increased risk, however, that the fetus will spontaneously
abort from the procedure (McCann). Therefore, in order to justify the risk to the fetus,
there should be a significant probability that the results o f the test would detect a
particular disposition toward disease. A thorough family health history must thus be
obtained to help determine the necessity o f such testing.
The parents will not only have to consider the welfare of the fetus, but they must
also consider the welfere of the mother. Although results from genetic tests can be
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determined within the first trimester, as in the case o f chorionic villus sampling, it is not
always possible to do so. Anmiocentesis delays the availability of a diagnosis by almost
two months (Veip et al. 614). As the results are received later in the pregnancy, the time
available for understanding and discussing the uniqueness o f the situation decreases.
Accordingly, there is a smaller window o f time to make the decision.
This window for decision making is constrained on one side by the technology of
genetic screenings. Chorionic villus sampling is performed between 7-11 weeks o f
pregnancy, and amniocentesis between 15-17 weeks, each needing approximately 2
weeks to receive the results. On the other side, the window is constrained by increased
risk of harm to mother, increased emotional attachment to the fetus, and a recommended
gestational limit o f 24-28 weeks (Verp et al. 614). Because o f these factors, the option of
abortion becomes a less viable option as the pregnancy proceeds. If abortion is to remain
an option, the parents are then left with less time to reflect upon the various implications
of their decision, and, consequently, have less time to make a decision based upon their
considered j udgments.
This short window o f time seems especially cramped when the nature o f the
decision is brought to light. The parents are essentially trying to determine if the harm of
aborting the fetus is better than the harm of delivering a child who must live with a
particular malady. O f course, the harm o f some maladies is clearly extensive, such as the
case of anencephaly, in which the fetus develops without a brain. But there are some
maladies, for example cystic fibrosis, for which treatment is available, and improving,
such that life expectancy is up into the 20’s and 30’s. It seems reasonable to decide that
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the harm in delivering an anencephalous infant justifies the harm o f abortion, but
questions are raised in the case of cystic fibrosis. What sort o f life is worth living?
There are two sets of information that must be addressed if parents are ever to
make a decision that does not rest upon ignorance, bias, or pure chance. The first set is
the factual considerations that go into making the decision, and the second set is the
particularly moral considerations and consequences of their decision. I will briefly
address the first set o f factual information in prenatal decision-making, but will spend
most o f my analysis on the more intractable issues o f the second set.
III. Role o f Genetic Counselors
The primary role o f genetic counselors is to provide clients with accurate, up-todate information about the facts pertinent to their situation. In a case where a fetus has
been positively linked to the cystic fibrosis gene marker, the genetic counselor would
explain various aspects of the disease to the parents. These might include the probability
that the child would actually suffer from the disease, the range of severity of the disease,
and the available treatment options for a child with cystic fibrosis. To the average lay
person, the language o f genetics and genetic screens may seem foreign. To speak in
terms o f probability is to speak in a language that humans are notoriously inept at
comprehending. It is because the results o f genetic tests are largely undecipherable to the
untrained person that the need for a skilled translator has arisen. Genetic counselors are
persons trained in genetics, in the mechanics o f laboratory testing, and in counseling.
Their duty is to translate genetic information into terms that the client can understand.
Thus, genetic counselors ensure that parents have all o f the facts regarding the results,
which gives them a basis from which they can begin to make a decision.
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Thus, with regard to the two sets o f pertinent information, genetic counselors
address the first set, the factual considerations. Any moral decision must reflect the facts
o f the situation. Without its attending facts, a moral decision is blind in its prescription.
The factual information that is supplied by genetic counselors provides the necessary
conditions that will help the parents determine which options are real options. Thus,
genetic counselors have a role-related duty to provide their clients with the basic factual
information.
It does not follow, however, that the presentation of facts is the counselor’s only
duty. As a profession, genetic counseling prides itself upon respect for the client’s
autonomy. It aspires to be value-neutral in its presentation o f the facts, and allows the
client the fteedom to evaluate the situation according to his or her own values. Given the
past practices of sterilization campaigns and extreme paternalism by physicians/ this
separation between facts and values has valid historical reasons for its justification.
However, strong arguments have recently been raised that this separation is no longer
tenable,^ and that genetic counselors should take a more active role in providing moral
guidance.^ If indeed it is true that genetic counselors must involve themselves in the
evaluation of the facts as part o f their presentation to their clients, then it would seem that
genetic counselors also have a role-related responsibility to facilitate an understanding of
the ethical dimensions of the situation.

‘ For a more in depth discussion of the values and practices in the history of genetic counseling, see James
Sorenson.
* See Dan Brock.
^ See Karen Grandstrand Gervais. It should be noted that she does not call for a return to a paternalistic
approach to genetic counseling. Rather, Gervais is directive in that she calls upon genetic counselors to
encourage clients to consider the full range of issues.
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There have been two notable attempts to bring morality to bear upon the issues
raised by genetic testing/ both originating in the autonomy of persons. Thus, the focus
o f these moral systems is upon the duties of the genetic counselor to respect the beliefs
and decisions of the client regardless o f their content. They focus their attention upon
resolving quandaries involving confidentiality or whether or not to inform clients about
false paternity. In these limited respects, both moral systems do an adequate job o f
resolving the dilemmas.^ But to the extent that they attempt to capture the ethical
dimensions of prenatal testing, they simply ignore the more intractable issues that arise.
IV. Overzealous Pruning
In his book. Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy. Bernard Williams chastises a
modem conception of morality that attempts to distill the ethical life into a simple
principle or system. Williams’s “morality” is characterized by a relentless semeh for an
“Archimedean Point,” a foundation from which all moral issues might be uniquely
resolved. But past attempts to find such a point either in well-being (Aristotle) or
practical reason (Kant) have both failed. Since such a foundation cannot be found, at
least in any powerful way, attempts to do so are not mere folly. They actually harm the
ethical enterprise by diverting its attention away from the richness o f the ethical life and
restricting its scope. We should, then, commit ourselves to the messiness o f ethical life,
and work to explicate and understand the issues that face us.
In order to bring prenatal testing under a principled morality, it was necessary to
consider one aspect of the ethical milieu - that o f genetic counseling. But by confining

See Bernard Gert et al. and Beauchamp and Childress.
^ However, I do concede that with respect to resolving bioethical dilemmas, Gert’s system of moral
analysis presents a more reasonable and consistent method than the checklist of principles of Beauchamp
and Childress.
*
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the ethical scope of genetic testing to the responsibilities o f genetic counselors, principled
moral systems ultimately fail to grasp the rich complexity o f ethical issues that attend
prenatal testing. To illustrate how the search for universal principles restricts ethical
inquiry, let us take a closer look at Bernard Gert’s method o f moral analysis.
In analyzing the moral issues surrounding genetic testing, Gert ultimately finds
his foundation in the Kantian idea of a rational and impartial agent. Gert then distills
from the ethical life a primary motivation—the avoidance o f harm. Given the rational and
impartial nature o f humans and their motivation to avoid harm, a set of moral rules can be
established. According to Gert, all rational and impartial agents would agree to this set of
moral rules for the foundation of a moral system. An appeal for the legitimacy o f the
system is grounded in the universal consensus o f the moral rules. Once he has
established the moral rules as a public product, Gert has a code of conduct to which all
rational and impartial agents could agree.^
At its foundation, Gert’s moral system appeals to impartial principles to determine
which actions are prohibited, given the universal motivation to avoid harm. Although
there may be some question as to whether or not the avoidance of harm is our primaiy
motivation, a more damning criticism o f Gert’s system is that which Williams raises
against all systems based upon a Kantian notion of impartiality. Williams contests the
idea that when we are deliberating a moral dilemma, we can extract ourselves from the
situation and arrive at impartial principles. While it may be possible to distance
ourselves from the situation through reflection, it does not explain how the impartial

®Although Gert’s system is more complex than my cursory sketch portrays, complete with justifications for
violations of the moral rules and an additional analysis of moral ideals, it ultimately relies upon the basic
foundation that I have described.
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principles are achieved. When we extract ourselves from our particular situations, we do
not become detached selves, merging into an impartial, communal self. We remain the
selves that are doing the extracting. Therefore, a lth o i^ we can say that it is reasonable
to accept the moral rules for oneself, we cannot say that it is reasonable for others to
accept them (Williams 61), which is essential for Gert’s moral system. The only way we
can arrive at these impartial principles together is if we are already committed to them.
The foundation of Gert’s moral system, like all moral foundations, is thus an illusion.
However, according to Williams, the folly o f pursuing philosophical mirages is
not without its costs. It is a harmful distraction from the more important process of
coming to understand the issues that attend the ethical life. By focusing upon the
responsibilities of genetic counselors to the exclusion o f the clients, Gert and other moral
systematists oversimplify the problems that face us and underestimate the complexity of
the moral decisions that must be made. The ethical issues that attend prenatal testing
cannot be restricted to those that surround the translation o f facts and probabilities. The
moral issues extend beyond the conveyance of factual information.
V. A Thickening of the Thicket
A full exploration into the ethical issues surrounding prenatal testing must address
the decisions that are being made by the parents, and consider the various parties who are
implicated in the decision-making process. I will address three such parties: the
biomedical community, society, and the parents. With the addition of each interested
party, the complexity of the ethical dimensions o f prenatal testing multiplies, until the
decision o f whether to abort or not challenges the limits o f traditional morality.
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The first group that is implicated in the decision of the parents is the biomedical
community. We have seen that in order for parents to be able to make a decision that is
not based upon ignorance, bias, or chance, they need to be aware o f the facts of the
situation. However, the parents must also be able to evaluate these facts. In order to do
this, parents need to make judgments concerning the definition of terms like ‘disease’ and
‘severe.’ Although all parents have some thin idea o f what these terms mean, the
decisions that they will make depend upon thorough conceptions of these terms. Parents
must be able to determine that anencephaly is a severe disease,’ and that this severe
disease would cause more harm if the pregnancy was continued than if it were to be
terminated.
Since one of the problems parents must overcome is this lack of clear conceptions
o f ‘disease’ and ‘severe,’ they will often look to the biomedical professionals to fill out
these terms. But the biomedical communily is hardly more prepared to substantively
define these ternis than parents. In medicine, disease is sometimes defined as any
condition that threatens the health o f an individual, or deviates from a healthy
individual’s normal functioning.^ But health’ is no more explicit a term than ‘disease’;
in fact, it is the key concept that needs clarification in order to determine the right course
of action in prenatal testing situations. In order to know what terms like ‘disease’ and
‘severe’ are, we must first have some idea o f the core concept of ‘health. ’ If the
professionals of the biomedical community, like genetic counselors, either cannot provide
these substantive definitions or will not provide them because of the evaluative content of
such definitions, then parents are left isolated and must resort to ad hoc reasoning.

^ For a discussion of the definition o f‘health’ based upon organ function, see Boorse 1987.
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Here, we must at least consider the possibility o f parents having questionable
intentions for aborting a fetus. It is reasonable to assume that all parents desire a
perfectly healthy child. But a cultural tendency to expect nothing less than a perfect child
may result when the vagueness o f what constitutes a ‘healthy child’ is combii^d with the
power to know if one has a ‘diseased child.’ Consider the example o f chromosomal
trisomy 47, XXY. The fetus carries an extra sex chromosome, which might legitimately
be considered a disease in that it causes a deviation from normal functioning. Although
the infant will most likely be phenotypically normal and perhaps taller as an adult, the
child will likely have a low IQ, characteristically leading to difficulty in school and in
psychosocial development. Parents are additionally informed that this difficulty in
psychosocial development correlates with ten times the chances o f the child being
incarcerated as an adult (Verp et al. 615). Why should parents accept these
circumstances when there are other opportunities for creating a more perfect child?
When the evaluative terms used by the biomedical community are left to be applied by
parents, some eugenic trends might begin to creep into the decision to abort, even in
cases where the genetic anomalies are not generally considered ‘severe,’ as we will soon
see.
It may be argued that even if these eugenic trends were being established, it is for
the parents to determine whether the affected fetus is brought to term. But this argument
belies an assumption which implicates the society’s interests in the parents’ decision
making process. This argument assumes that the decision is uniquely the parents’
concern, i.e. the choice to abort a fetus rests solely in the hands of the parents,
specifically in the hands of the woman in the legal tradition. Yet, as the example of
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parental decision making in the case of sex chromosome anomalies suggests, there is a
peculiar, yet compelling, societal concern which arises in the context of genetic testing.
If such a societal concern can be legitimized, the richness o f the issues pertinent to the
decision reaches a further level of complexity, one that challenges the sovereignty of
individual autonomy.
To say that the right of parents to choose an abortion extends to the decisions
regarding genetic testing is to confuse the abortion o f a fetus with the abortion of a
particular fetus because of certain characteristics. By aborting a particular fetus with trait
X, one is saying that trait X is negative enough to overshadow other considerations that
might require our respect, i.e. the parents would want the fetus to continue development
if it did not have trait X. Although it might be argued that this judgment is strictly a
private decision that has no effect upon anyone other than the family, it might also be
argued that the effects of this judgment may very well extend beyond the parents in at
least two important ways.
In part of a study by Verp et al. in 1988, parents chose to abort fetuses with
autosomal aneuploidies (more or less than 2 copies o f a chromosome) in 87.5% o f cases
recorded. The study followed parents’ decisions for three types of aneuploidies:
trisomies 13,18, and 21. Although each disease has its unique manifestations, all three
diseases share similar prognoses o f severe mental retardation and shortened life spans. In
these cases, there is no clear directive concerning the decision to abort. Persuasive
arguments can be made both in favor of and in opposition to abortion, depending upon
the way in which the substantive concept o f ‘severe’ is understood. Because o f this
indeterminacy, the moral consequences for society are hard to discern, except the
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utilitarian concerns, which I reject, o f the economic burden such individuals place upon
society.
We can escape this indeterminacy and make the interests of society more easily
visible if we consider the results of the second part o f the same study. In the case o f sex
chromosome anomalies, parents chose to abort affected fetuses 41.2% o f the time (Verp
et al. 616). Although this study looked at four different aneuploidy arrangements in the
sex chromosomes, they all share much less severe disease symptoms. Each arrangement
in sex chromosomes ex^wesses itself differently, but in general, these individuals look
normal, have slight drops in average IQ, slight increases m psychosocial difficulties, may
be infertile, and pertiaps need hormonal treatments in adolescence. There is no decrease
in life expectancy or clear indications o f a painful life.
By aborting these fetuses in 41.2% o f the cases, these parents have, in effect,
stated that a s li^ t decrease in IQ and psychosocial adjustment, infertility, and hormonal
treatments cumulatively make a life unwordiy of the trouble. Here, the societal concern
is apparent when you consider those individuals in society who have these chromosomal
arrangements, and who are living fulfilling and worthwhile lives. Is the abortion o f an
otherwise desired fetus because o f ‘minor’ genetic anomalies an attack upon the lives o f
persons in society who have these same genetic anomalies? Is the decision to abort a
fetus because it has the female arrangement o f sex chromosomes (XX) an attack upon
women in society? I do not intend to address these highly charged questions in this
paper. I will leave these questions open for further exploration. These are used only to
point out that the decision o f the parents may extend to the concerns o f others in society.
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and to demonstrate the level o f complexity which ethical issues in genetic testing
achieves.
Society has a real interest in protecting the dignity o f its individual members from
discrimination. It may be concluded that selective abortion violates a person’s dignity,
and thus extends beyond the interests o f the parents in two ways. First, society may have
an interest in extending its protection to include the protection of friture persons against
discrimination. Thus, society would have an interest in prohibiting abortion only in cases
o f selective abortion in which the act is discriminating against future persons based upon
genetic criteria. Second, it could be determined that discriminating actions against
fetuses based upon certain genes also discriminates against persons Wio share those
genes. If either of these societal interests can be substantiated, then the autonomy of
parents to abort a fetus for particular reasons raises a host of issues to consider. But the
more important point for this paper is that these are questions that cannot go unanswered.
Ultimately, the decision to abort remains with the parents. Although they must
consider the impact o f their decision upon others, it is largely the psychological and
financial burden o f the parents to bear and raise the child. Therefore, the final decision
rests with the parents and relies upon their judgment. We have seen that the decisions
parents must make are complicated both by the vagueness o f concepts like ‘disease’ and
severe’, and by societal considerations. But there is another consideration that parents
must face, which will further add richness to this issue: parents must wrestle with their
fear o f contingency.
The contingency aspect o f moral decision making in the context of prenatal
testing can perhaps best be illuminated through an understanding o f the conflicting
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desires o f the concerned parents. On one side, the parents want a child, often any child.
They would embrace the birth of a little girl or little boy. They would equally embrace a
baby with curiy locks of hair or silky tufts of fuzz, sparkling blue eyes or deep brown
ones. All o f these genetic traits would be equally endearing, and in some senses, the
surprise following the awareness o f these traits is the beauty o f contingency in childbirth.
But on the other side, parents want a ‘healthy’ child. There are some contingencies that
parents fear, such as their child inheriting a debilitating disease. The contingencies of
childbirth thus strike both awe and fear into the hearts o f parents.
However, with the availability o f prenatal genetic information through testing,
parents can now separate these conflicting aspects o f contingency and prevent their child
from expressing a particular genetic disease. Although any life is full of things that occur
randomly and out o f one’s control, ^enatal genetic testing can offer a small, yet
powerfiil, respite from some o f the fearful contingencies o f childbirth. With a few
genetically identifiable diseases, parents can circumvent the contingency of inheriting a
genetic malady, and determine the relative health o f their child in this respect.
Although in some ways, this can be a wonderful new means to prevent the
suffering o f both parents and children, there are two points that must be kept in mind with
regard to the power to overcome contingency. First, we must remember that some
contingencies in genetics will always remain. We may be able to control certain aspects
o f genetics, but other aspects will remain indeterminate. Only the most straightforward
o f genetic diseases are detectable, or have any hope o f being detectable with precision.
At one level, the interactions between genes responsible for complex diseases are hard to
discern. And at another level, the interactions between genes and the environment
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exacerbate the complexities o f multiple gene interactions, ensuring some large areas of
indeterminacy. If we quixotically attempt to overextend our limited mastery over the
contingencies of childbirth, we are surely to be disappointed. And it will not be us, but
rather our children, who embody some o f the inevitable contingencies o f procreation,
who will bear the brunt o f our disillusionment.
The second consideration with regard to contingency is its inverse relationship
with responsibility. We tend to judge a person’s moral decisions more generously if the
person is acting in response to contingencies, as opposed to situations in which they have
helped determine the circumstances. Consider the example o f a boy who helped a kitten
down from a high tree branch. If the boy merely noticed the kitten on the branch, and
acted to bring the kitten down, we would morally applaud the boy. Had he not acted to
save the kitten, we would refrain from applauding him, but would tend not to make a
moral judgment against him. However, if the circumstances were different such that the
kitten in the tree is not a contingent fact for the boy, let us say that he chased the kitten up
the tree, then an absence o f action to help get the kitten down would be morally
deplorable. From this simple example, it is evident that the more we determine the
circumstances of a situation, the more moral responsibility we have over the outcome of
the situation. As we consider the possibility o f determining certain aspects of childbirth,
we must remember this relationship with responsibility.
We thus seemingly arrive at a paradox. Fetal genetic information made available
by prenatal testing seems to demand more from the parents who receive a positive
diagnosis than can reasonably be expected from them. Within a small window o f time,
parents must not only come to understand the factual considerations o f their situation.
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they must also come to appreciate the moral consi<krations I have described above. And
while the ability to comprehend these moral dimensions reach heroic proportions at the
level o f the individual, we have seen that the parents are increasingly more responsible
for the outcome o f their decision.
Consider a set of parents who learns that there is an 80% chance that their child
will not express the disease cystic fibrosis. They figure that the chances are pretty good
that their child will not express this disease. However, soon after the birth, it is
determined that the child does have a particularly severe form of cystic fibrosis. The
20% chance of the child expressing the disease actually occurred. The child spends the
next 6 years of her life in and out o f the hospital, suffering from the complications of
cystic fibrosis before death finally ends her suffering. Did the parents make a mistake?
Are they responsible for the suffering o f their daughter?
The answer to this paradox lies in its dissolution. To place the blame squarely on
the shoulders of the parents is to mistakenly believe that the decision is uniquely the
decision of the parents. As I have attempted to demonstrate, although the ultimate
decision rests with the parents, the parents are not moral actors independent of society.
The biomedical community gives the parents their concepts o f probability and ‘disease’
upon which the parents must make their decision. And society in general can promote an
over-confidence in mastering the contingencies o f childbirth. Just as society shares an
interest in the decisions of parents, so does society share responsibility for their results.
The paradox dissolves as we reintegrate society into the picture. Although the
complications that parents must consider are too much for isolated individuals, they are
not too much for a collective body o f individuals.
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VI. A Call to Landscape Thickets into Trimmed Hedges
Throughout this paper, I have attempted to present a picture o f the complexities
that arise with increased genetic information in the context of prenatal testing. I have
largely raised more questions than I have answered, but at this stage, we must be
concerned with the scope o f the problem before we move too quickly for solutions.
Following Williams, I have resisted the temptation o f bringing these issues immediately
under a moral system o f principles. Instead, I have attempted to explicate some o f the
more intractable problems that undergird the issues surrounding prenatal genetic testing.
At some point, we must turn our attention to the resolution o f these complex problems,
but this deserves the attention o f separate papers. Thus, I will end by merely proposing a
starting point for a sustained discussion o f how these issues might be resolved.
We have seen how both individual parents and society at large have interests in
the issues that arise in the context o f prenatal genetic testing. We should begin our
discussion with this core understanding. Once we admit this, we can address the various
complications that make these issues so difficult. As individuals always in relation to
society, we must define substantive concepts like ‘severe disease’ and ‘quality o f life.’
We must fill out these concepts with our collective experiences. Likewise, the proper
role of contingency in our lives must also be fully explored. How much contingency do
we want in our lives? Answering these questions up front as a collective group will
mitigate against the pressures placed upon the individual when he or she must decide as
an individual.
The most pressing concern that we face in contemporary life is the organization of
the influx o f information of all kinds. As individuals, we have little hope o f sorting
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through this mountain o f information and making responsible decisions based upon
careful consideration of the issues involved. But as a collective whole, there is hope:
hope to organize the information about the world, hope to understand our world, and
hope to guide the world by the common values that we hold.
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